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ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the uniqueness thesis, a core thesis in the epistemology 
of disagreement. After presenting uniqueness and clarifying relevant terms, a novel 
counterexample to the thesis will be introduced. This counterexample involves logical 
disagreement. Several objections to the counterexample are then considered, and it is 
argued that the best responses to the counterexample all undermine the initial motivation 
for uniqueness.  
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1. Introduction  
The uniqueness thesis (henceforth denoted ’UT’) concerns a relation between a 
body of evidence, a doxastic attitude and a proposition. Jonathan Matheson, a 
proponent of the thesis, defines UT as follows:  
(UT) For any body of evidence E and proposition P, E justifies at most one 
doxastic attitude toward P.1 
UT features frequently in the epistemology literature2 and is motivated by 
arguments concerning peer disagreement—if two epistemic peers3 disagree about a 
                                                        
1 Quote from Jonathan Matheson, “The Case for Rational Uniqueness,” Logos & Episteme II, 3 
(2011): 360.  
2 See for example Thomas Kelly, “Evidence Can Be Permissive,” in Contemporary Debates in 
Epistemology, eds. Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 298-
312, Roger White, “Evidence Cannot Be Permissive,” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 
eds. Steup, Turri, and Sosa, 312-323, Luis Rosa, “Justification and the Uniqueness Thesis,” Logos 
& Episteme III, 4 (2012): 571-577, Jonathan Matheson, “The Case for Rational Uniqueness,” 
Logos & Episteme II, 3 (2011): 359-373, Earl Conee, “Rational Disagreement Defended,” in 
Disagreement, eds. Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield (Oxford University Press, 2010), 69-
90.  
3 Roughly put, two agents in disagreement are epistemic peers when neither side is epistemically 
superior with respect to the proposition at hand, i.e., when the two are similar enough in all 
relevant factors such as evidence, track record, time constraints etc.  
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proposition P, is it then possible that they are both justified in their doxastic 
attitudes toward P? If UT is true, then the answer is negative. 
Importantly, there are in fact several non-equivalent definitions of UT in the 
literature.4 Thomas Kelly, for example, favors a formulation of UT saying that there 
is exactly one justified doxastic attitude given a body of evidence,5 while Matheson 
prefers at most one, as we have just seen. Matheson notes that in most cases there 
will be exactly one justified doxastic attitude given a body of evidence, but in some 
situations, there may be no justified doxastic attitude toward P whatsoever. This 
can arguably happen when one is not able to, or when it is simply not possible to, 
comprehend the proposition at hand.6 If one takes comprehension of P to be a 
necessary condition for the existence of a justified doxastic attitude toward P, then 
it seems most reasonable to use Matheson’s weaker definition of UT. Thus, this is 
what we will assume here. Further,we will adopt Matheson’s assumption that the 
term ‘doxastic attitude’ can only refer to the following three possibilities: belief 
that P, disbelief that P and suspension of judgement with respect to P, i.e., the 
possibility space of attitudes that one can take toward a proposition P is exhausted 
by these three attitudes.7 Now, UT puts a constraint on the total number of 
doxastic attitudes that a body of evidence can justify toward a proposition. 
According to UT any body of evidence E justifies at most one doxastic attitude 
toward P. In other words, according to UT, there exists no body of evidence E such 
that E justifies both belief and disbelief toward P. Similarly, of course, the thesis 
implies that there exists no E such that E justifies both a (dis)belief in P and 
suspension of judgement with respect to P. In the paper “The Case for Rational 
Uniqueness,” Matheson makes two further clarifying remarks about UT:  
(UT) [...] makes no reference to individuals or times since (UT) claims (in part) 
that who possesses the body of evidence, as well as when it is possessed, makes no 
difference regarding which doxastic attitude is justified (if any) toward any 
particular proposition by that body of evidence.8 
(UT) concerns propositional justification, rather than doxastic justification. That 
is, the kind of justification relevant to (UT) is solely a relation between a body of 
                                                        
4 This is noted by Matheson, “The Case for Rational Uniqueness,” 360-361. 
5 Thomas Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” in Disagreement, eds. 
Feldman and Warfield, 119.  
6 See Richard Feldman, “Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement,” in Epistemology Futures, 
ed. S. Hetherington (Oxford University Press, 2006) for a motivation of this view. 
7 This assumption is common in the contemporary literature, see for example Rosa, “Justification 
and the Uniqueness Thesis,” Matheson, “The Case for Rational Uniqueness,” Kelly, “Peer 
Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.” 
8 Quote from Matheson, “The Case for Rational Uniqueness,” 360. 
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evidence, a doxastic attitude, and a proposition. How individuals have come to 
have the doxastic attitudes they have toward the proposition in question will not 
be relevant to our discussion. Further, individuals can be propositionally justified 
in adopting attitudes toward propositions which they psychologically cannot 
adopt [...] Importantly, it is not a necessary condition for being justified in 
believing p that one be able to demonstrate that one is justified in believing.9 
The first of these quotes states that according to UT a given body of evidence E 
justifies exactly the same doxastic attitude (if any) towards P, no matter the subject 
that assesses E and at what time this is done. In the second quote, Matheson 
distinguishes between propositional and doxastic justification, where the former is 
a relation between a body of evidence, a doxastic attitude and a proposition, the 
latter concerns how a given individual came to adopt a specific doxastic attitude 
towards a proposition, i.e., doxastic justification is concerned with one’s reasons for 
actually adopting a certain attitude toward P. Doxastic justification presumes that a 
given individual has a certain attitude toward P, and the question is then whether 
or not this individual has sufficient reason to be justified in having that attitude. 
When it comes to propositional justification, on the other hand, it is irrelevant 
whether any individual is ever concerned with P; the crux of propositional 
justification is that a justification-relation between a body of evidence, a doxastic 
attitude and a proposition holds, not whether any individual realizes this. 
Understood in this way propositional justification refers to an external relation, 
and an individual can accordingly be propositionally justified in a doxastic attitude 
towards P even though this individual has not adopted the relevant attitude 
psychologically. And hence, it is not necessary for a subject to be able to 
demonstrate or defend this given attitude towards P in order for it to be 
propositionally justified. Matheson tells us that UT is a thesis concerning 
propositional justification rather than doxastic justification. 
2. Clarifications 
Before we move on to consider the announced counterexample to UT, let us pause 
to further specify what is meant by ‘justification’ and ‘evidence’ in the rest of the 
text. We will deliberately stay on a high level of generality in order not to exclude 
too many accounts of justification and evidence from the later discussions in 
sections 3 and 4. 
When using the term ‘justification,’ this use is naturally restricted to the 
epistemic domain, we are not concerned with any practical issues whatsoever. So, 
in other words, our concern is with the justification of doxastic attitudes towards 
                                                        
9 Quote from Matheson, “The Case for Rational Uniqueness,” 360-361. 
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propositions. This kind of justification is regulated by epistemic norms, i.e., truth-
conducive norms, and as indicated in section 1, we are concerned with 
propositional justification, rather than doxastic justification.10 
Our use of the term ‘evidence’ assumes that we can all agree that evidence 
can stem from many different sources like direct visual perception, testimony from 
individuals or media, scientific experiments etc. The only constraints we will force 
on our understanding of evidence from the outset are: (1) evidence must be 
propositional (and thus truth-apt), (2) any piece of evidence must be true, (3) any 
piece of evidence must (at least in principle) be accessible to human beings, and (4) 
evidence should be supportive of doxastic attitudes, where support may be 
interpreted probabilistically, but does not have to be.  
(2) is arguably the most controversial among these four constraints. 
However, for our purposes there is a very good reason for including this factivity 
condition. To see this, suppose that one could have false (misleading) pieces of 
evidence in one’s body of evidence E. Then, given the further assumption that false 
evidence can support anything, we could easily have a situation where a true bit of 
evidence e1 supports the belief that P, while a false bit of evidence e2 supports the 
belief that not-P. This would in effect trivialize the debate about UT; on this 
account of evidence UT is obviously false.11 Hence, we should either accept that 
evidence is factive or we should deny that false evidence can support anything. For 
the rest of the paper we will take the first option.  
3. The Argument from Logical Disagreement  
Consider now the following case against UT:  
Logical Disagreement. Two logicians, S1 and S2, are walking into an empty 
auditorium where they find a deduction written on a blackboard. S1 and S2 are 
simultaneously looking at the board. As it happens, S1 is a classical logician, while 
S2 is an intuitionist. Now, the deduction consists in a finite number of steps, so all 
steps of the deduction except for the conclusion C will serve as a common body of 
                                                        
10 The literature on epistemic justification is vast, but prominent examples of theories of 
justification can be found in: Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, Evidentialism (Oxford University 
Press, 2004),Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford University Press, 2000), 
Ernest Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 1991), William Alston, 
Epistemic Justification (Cornell University Press, 1989), Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and 
Cognition (Harvard University Press, 1986), Laurence BonJour, The Structure of Empirical 
Knowledge (Harvard University Press, 1985), Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, “Evidentialism,” 
Philosophical Studies 48 (1985): 15-34, Alvin Goldman, “What Is Justified Belief?,” in 
Justification and Knowledge, ed. G. Pappas (Springer, 1979),1-23. 
11 Thanks to Francesco Berto for pressing this point about false (misleading) evidence.  
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evidence E, i.e., a set of propositions that are represented in a language that both 
logicians fully comprehend. The central question is then whether E entails C. 
Suppose that C on line n is the result of applying DNE (double negation 
elimination) to not-not-C on line n − 1.12 As S1 accepts classical logic, she also 
accepts the inference from not-not-C to C, while S2, given her intuitionist 
convictions, denies DNE as a rule of inference and thus denies that C comes out 
supported by E.  
In this case we have a situation in which two agents possess exactly (!) the same 
evidence (the propositions represented by lines n − 1 on the blackboard), but they 
are justified in diverging doxastic attitudes towards the relevant proposition in 
question, namely C. We see that E justifies S1 in her belief that P, while E justifies 
(at least) suspension of judgement regarding P for S2 (P is not supported by E). 
Thus, the case is a clear counterexample to UT as the number of attitudes that E 
justifies exceeds one. Of course, as the reader will have noticed by now, the case is 
concerned with a special type of evidence, i.e., evidence of the completely formal 
type that we find in pure logic and mathematics. This means that the 
counterexample is narrow in the sense that it does not indicate the existence of 
counterexamples to UT among other types of evidence.13 However, this will be 
completely irrelevant as long as we regard UT as a general epistemic principle. If 
                                                        
12 Using standard notation DNE is an inference from Γ ˫ ¬¬φ to Γ ˫ φ, where ‘Γ’ denotes a set of 
sentences in a given language, ‘˫’ denotes deducibility from left to right and ‘φ’ picks out a single 
sentence of the language. Some readers may point out that it is underspecified in the case above 
whether S1 and S2 disagree over an instance or a schema of DNE. This is true, but it will not 
make a significant difference to the main argument of the paper. 
13 However, some epistemologists have suggested that there are counterexamples to UT among 
other types of evidence. Consider, for example, a case where S1 and S2 discuss which football 
team will win the national league this season. Suppose that their discussion takes place the day 
before the final match day, and at this point of the season only two teams can win; either team A 
or team B. Suppose further that the only evidence available to the subjects is a certain newspaper 
statistic, which shows the scores of the season so far. According to this statistic, team A is in 
front of team B by the smallest possible margin. Now, S1 is convinced that team A will take the 
championship due to the statistical support for this (they are ahead at this point). However, S2 
suspends judgement about who will be the champions as team A leads with the smallest possible 
margin and it is still possible for team B to make it. In such a case the proponent of UT should 
say that at most one of the subjects’ doxastic attitudes is justified, but one might reasonably argue 
that this is wrong. In such borderline cases it seems that at least two out of three doxastic 
attitudes could be justified. If this is right, we have a counterexample to UT using another type of 
evidence, i.e., empirical data. Find similar borderline cases in Kelly, “Evidence Can Be 
Permissive,” 299-300. 
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the case holds, we will have the necessary and sufficient counterexample needed to 
reject UT. 
4. Objections and Responses  
As the case presented above will be very hard to accept for many readers (for 
various reasons), the rest of the paper aims to motivate the argument from logical 
disagreement. The strategy here is simple. While discussing various objections to 
Logical Disagreement, it will become clear that the UT-proponent can only avoid 
the counterexample by undermining the initial motivation behind UT, i.e., 
explaining away the counterexample to UT will lead to an indirect defeat of the 
thesis. In the following, five objections to Logical Disagreement will be scrutinized 
(subsections 4.1-4.5). The first two will simply be rejected, the third will be found 
underdeveloped, and while the remaining two can actually explain away the 
counterexample to UT, this can only be done by undermining the motivation 
behind the principle.  
4.1 Evidence Is Contingent  
Objection 1. Even though the evidence E present in Logical Disagreement satisfies 
our four rudimentary constraints on evidence (cf. section 2) as E is propositional, 
factive, accessible and supportive, E is still not a genuine body of evidence. This is 
because only contingent propositions can be evidence. Thus, UT is not even 
applicable in Logical Disagreement. 
First of all, there is no principle reason why necessary propositions such as the 
ones found in pure mathematics and logic cannot be counted as evidence. 
Propositions of logic and mathematics can clearly serve the supportive role of 
evidence very well, i.e., such propositions speak in favor of certain hypotheses in 
the strongest possible way (by entailment). Hence, if any proposition is able to 
justify a belief, it seems that pure logical or mathematical propositions are ideal 
candidates. Habit may dictate, perhaps leading back to acceptance of Hume’s Fork, 
that some of us cannot see the point in taking purely formal premises of deductive 
arguments as evidence, but without further qualification this is obviously not a 
good argument for accepting such an exclusion in philosophical or scientific work. 
Moreover, accepting Objection 1 leads to absurd consequences when we hold other 
plausible epistemic principles to be true. Take for example Timothy Williamson’s 
principle E = K, i.e., evidence equals knowledge.14 If we accept that our evidence is 
coextensive with our knowledge, and that Objection 1 holds, it directly follows 
                                                        
14 Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits, chapter 9.  
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that we cannot have pure mathematical or logical knowledge. To deny that we can 
and do have such knowledge would not only be absurd, it would be intellectual 
suicide.  
4.2 Communication Breakdown  
Objection 2. The case Logical Disagreement misrepresents the interaction between 
classical logicians and intuitionists. Where the classical logician works with a 
philosophical presupposition of a world of mathematical objects independent of 
the thinking subject (objects that obey the laws of classical logic and can stand in 
set-theoretic relations), this is radically different from the intuitionists who 
advocate for constructive methods and take mathematics to be about mental 
constructions. As a result of this schism, the two logicians in the proposed case 
would run into an insurmountable communication breakdown, i.e., the DNE-
inference acceptable to the classical logician would not even be understandable to 
the intuitionist – it would be nonsense. To quote Brouwer: “Let us now consider 
the concept: ’denumerably infinite ordinal number.’ From the fact that this 
concept has a clear and well-defined meaning for both formalist and intuitionist, 
the former infers the right to create the ’set of all denumerably infinite ordinal 
numbers,’ the power of which he calls aleph-one, a right not recognized by the 
intuitionist.”15 Something similar to what Brouwer describes in the interaction 
between diverse logical traditions in this quote occurs in Logical Disagreement 
with respect to DNE, i.e., the intuitionist does simply not comprehend the final 
step of the deduction on the blackboard. Thus, suspension of judgement is not a 
justified doxastic attitude for the intuitionist in this case; the supposed logical 
connection between E and C is gibberish to her. Rather, Logical Disagreement 
represents the kind of case where there is no justified doxastic attitude for the 
intuitionist to have. Hence, UT would be saved (at least the at most one doxastic 
attitude-version of the thesis). The case allows only one justified attitude, namely 
the attitude of the classical logician.  
This objection overstates the divide between the classical and intuitionist 
traditions. Comprehension of classical logic is often presupposed in discussions of 
non-classical logical systems, e.g., as a meta-theory. Indeed, it is stipulated in 
Logical Disagreement that the deduction found on the blackboard is written in a 
language that both logicians fully comprehend. We do not need more than 
noticing and appreciating this very stipulation in order to slide off the objection. 
Further, we can strengthen this reply by noticing that it is not the case that when 
there is logical disagreement, one party has automatically misunderstood (or lacks) 
some concept. The disagreement may just be the result of one side having false 
                                                        
15 Quote from Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer, ”Intuitionism and Formalism,” Bulletin of the 
American Mathematical Society 20 (1913): 91. 
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beliefs. So, in Logical Disagreement, it need not be the case that the intuitionist 
(supposing that she got it wrong) lacks some concept about how negation works, or 
has misunderstood or changed its meaning. Negation means whatever it means, 
also in the intuitionist’s mouth, she just has false beliefs about that meaning.16 
4.3 Logical Monism  
Now, let us turn to the more challenging objections.  
Objection 3. The evidence does in fact justify exactly one doxastic attitude in 
Logical Disagreement, it is just that we do not know which attitude it is. For we 
do not know which logic is the “correct” model of logical consequence, but surely 
there is only one correct logic in the end. Thus, UT survives the case even though 
the underlying logical disagreement leaves us in the dark with respect to what 
doxastic attitude is justified.  
This objection begs the question against logical pluralists (something like Beall & 
Restall-style pluralists), i.e., the view that there is more than one true logic; there 
is not always a single answer to the question whether a proposition P logically 
follows from a set of propositions (premises), in some cases there are more than 
one correct answer. A rough motivation for this kind of pluralism is that classical 
logic(s), relevance logic(s), intuitionistic logic(s) etc., all have a rightful place in 
formalizing and restraining logical inference as various important aspects of our 
pre-theoretic notion of logical consequence can be explicated by each of these 
approaches to logic. Clearly, begging the question against the pluralist in this way 
merely relocates the tension from an infight between UT-supporters and -deniers 
to a clash between logical monism and pluralism, so it seems like a dissatisfying 
option. Of course, some UT-supporters might be happy to say that logical pluralism 
is false, and thus they will have a way to save their principle, but this strategy 
should be supported by strong independent reasons. It will not be enough for the 
UT-supporter to accept logical monism because it seems like the default position 
amongst epistemologists. Hence, Objection 3 is underdeveloped as it stands, and 
UT-supporters opting for this way out have further work to do. Developing the 
back and forth between logical monists and pluralists any further here would take 
us beyond the scope of this paper, but find a few useful references in the footnote 
below.17 
                                                        
16 A similar point is made by Williamson; see Timothy Williamson, The Philosophy of 
Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2007), chapter 4.  
17 For more on logical pluralism in the Beall & Restall-style, see e.g., JC Beall and Greg Restall, 
Logical Pluralism (Oxford University Press, 2005), JC Beall and Greg Restall, “Logical Pluralism,” 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78, 4 (2000): 475–493. Other kinds of logical pluralism can be 
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4.4 Splitting the Evidence  
Objection 4. As S1 and S2 belong to two opposing traditions in logic and thus do 
not accept the same rules of inference, it is actually not the case that they possess 
the same evidence in the situation described. Surely, considered as a set of 
propositions, the evidence is the same for both subjects, but due to the subject’s 
diverse logical backgrounds the evidence splits in two. The case really presents 
both E and E*, where the acceptable inference rules of classical logic are tacitly 
accepted to induce E and the rules of intuitionist logic are tacitly accepted to 
induce E*. No purely formal body of evidence (or set of propositions) supports 
anything pre-theoretically. Pre-inquiry acceptance of a logical system (or another 
kind of systematic method) is necessary to even generate evidence. Pre-
theoretically, the question of which doxastic attitude is supported by a formal 
body of evidence is empty. Hence, Logical Disagreement is not a counterexample 
to UT since each body of evidence only justifies one doxastic attitude.  
Prima facie, this objection seems to have something going for it. Indeed, it might 
save UT seen as a general epistemic principle since at most one doxastic attitude 
can be justified per body of evidence. However, at the same time it undermines the 
initial appeal of UT. For if we need a prior systematic method in order to even 
generate formal evidence, we get a kind of evidential relativism. To illustrate, take 
an arbitrary set of purely formal propositions. This set does not constitute a unique 
body of evidence, as would be natural to suppose, instead it constitutes as many 
different bodies of evidence as there are acceptable systematic methods of inquiry. 
This moves our discussion away from evidence to a discussion of acceptable 
methods, but this discussion should not be relevant to UT. UT should not be true 
only relative to preferred methodology. For let us remind ourselves of how strong a 
thesis UT really is: it concerns all bodies of evidence, no matter what subject 
possesses it and no matter the time and circumstances. The crucial point is that UT 
is supposed to motivate a certain response to peer disagreement, i.e., at most one 
peer can be justified in such disagreements. But if formal evidence is relativized to 
method, the scope of UT is reduced drastically. You can now only share formal 
evidence with those from your own methodological equivalence class, and there 
can be as many of those classes as there are acceptable methods. This kind of 
relativism is clearly not desirable for a UT-proponent, and thus saving UT using 
                                                                                                                      
found in: Steward Shapiro, Vagueness in Context (Oxford University Press, 2006), Rudolf 
Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language (Open Court, 1937/2002). For an overview, see Gillian 
Russell, “Logical Pluralism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition), 
ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/logical-
pluralism/. 
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Objection 4 turns out to be a Pyrrhic victory.18 However, some might hesitate to 
admit that Objection 4 leads to evidential relativism regarding formal evidence, for 
it may be objected that E and E* do not have the same epistemic status. There could 
be good and purely epistemic reasons for favoring E over E* (or vice versa) the 
reply goes. As noted above, E is the body of evidence induced by the tacit 
acceptance of classical logic, while E* is the result of tacitly accepting intuitionist 
logic, but surely logicians do not just accept any old system of logic, they have 
epistemic reasons for accepting whatever system they favor. Thus, S1’s total 
evidence pool may very well include evidence for accepting DNE, law of the 
excluded middle etc., which the intuitionist lacks. Similarly, S2’s total evidence 
pool may well include evidence for denying DNE, law of the excluded middle etc., 
which the classical logician does not have in her possession. Further, S1’s reasons 
may be better than S2’s ditto (or vice versa).  
Although this worry is legitimate, it will not save UT. First, it is 
underspecified in the literature whether UT is meant to apply to the total bodies of 
evidence in this sense, i.e., including pieces of evidence supporting one’s methods 
used to generate evidence. There are hints about the importance of evidence for 
evidence-generating methods in the literature on deep disagreement,19 but usually 
such evidence is taken as background information, and thus not as included in 
whatever body of evidence is under consideration in standard (deep) disagreement 
cases. Thus, it is not clear what UT-proponents would say about cases involving 
such total bodies of evidence. Further, one could easily rewrite Logical 
Disagreement stipulating that the two logicians were (known) epistemic peers. 
                                                        
18 Other epistemologists have suggested that one way in which uniqueness might fail is if there is 
a plurality of methods (in a broad sense) which one could reasonably use to generate evidence. 
Accordingly, the counterexample Logical Disagreement presented here and my discussion about 
formal evidence being relativized to acceptable methods might reasonably be subsumed under a 
broader style of argument against uniqueness, namely that UT fails because evidence (of various 
types) is relative to acceptable methods. For further discussion of this general style of argument 
see Greta Turnbull, “Why dinosaur paleobiology shows us that reasonable disagreement is 
possible,” unpublished manuscript, Steven Hales, “Motivations for Relativism as a Solution to 
Disagreements,” Philosophy 89, 1 (2014): 63-82, Alvin Goldman, “Epistemic Relativism and 
Reasonable Disagreement,” in Disagreement, eds. Feldman and Warfield, 187-215. 
19 For discussions of deep disagreement, see Klemens Kappel, “Higher Order Evidence and Deep 
Disagreement,” Topoi (2018): 1-12, Michael Lynch, “After the Spade Turns: Disagreement, First 
Principles and Epistemic Contractarianism,” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism (6) 
(2016):248-259, Klemens Kappel, “The Problem of Deep Disagreement,” Discipline Filosofiche 22 
(2) (2012): 7-25, Michael Lynch, “Epistemic Circularity and Epistemic. Incommensurability,” in 
Social Epistemology, eds. Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (Oxford 
University Press 2010), 262-277. 
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Then, insofar as evidential symmetry is necessary for peerhood, this would exclude 
any evidence from the case besides the common evidence. Of course, one could 
then say that if S1 is a classical logician and S2 an intuitionist, they cannot be 
epistemic peers, but in that case, we are back to square one; formal evidence 
becomes relativized to your own methodological equivalence class and relativism 
looms.  
4.5 Individualistic Versus Social Epistemology  
Objection 5. UT is most plausibly defended as an intra-personal thesis, but Logical 
Disagreement is an inter-personal case. Thomas Kelly distinguishes between intra-
personal and inter-personal versions of UT. 
UTIntra: Given that my evidence is E, there is some doxastic attitude D that is the 
only fully rational doxastic attitude for me to take towards proposition p[...].20 
UTInter: Given evidence E, there is some doxastic attitude D that is the only fully 
rational doxastic attitude for anyone to take towards proposition p[...].21 
UTIntra holds as a general epistemic principle. 
This objection saves UT as a general epistemic principle in the intra-personal 
domain, but as should be clear, it completely undermines the core motivation for 
the thesis, which is social. Instead of relativizing to methods as in Objection 4, E is 
now relativized to subjects, and an even worse kind of relativism is unavoidable.  
I agree that UTIntra is true. Take a perceptual case. If S clearly sees that 
there is a computer in front of her on the table and this visual perception 
constitutes her evidence, then under normal circumstances there will be at most 
one justified doxastic attitude for her to adopt towards the proposition <there is a 
computer on the table>, i.e., S is justified in believing the proposition to be true 
and nothing besides this. Likewise, UTIntra is true in logical cases in so far as we 
assume that the subject in play has accepted a certain logical system prior to 
inquiry. This blocks cases where Logical Disagreement is reformulated as a single 
person-case with an eclectic logician who is neither dogmatic regarding the 
classical nor the intuitionist tradition in logic, but is fully competent in both 
traditions anyway. Given our assumption, this logician cannot be intra-personally 
justified in more than one doxastic attitude towards P, e.g., the eclectic logician 
cannot be justified in a belief that P as well as a suspension of judgement with 
                                                        
20 Quote from Kelly, “Evidence Can Be Permissive,” 307. Note that even though Kelly uses the 
term ‘rational’ instead of ‘justified’ in this quote, it will not make any substantial difference for 
our purposes.  
21 See footnote 20. 
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respect to P based on the same body of evidence. However, as mentioned above, 
admitting that only UTIntra is true comes with an unbearable cost for the UT-
proponent. For with the embrace of this view, UT is no longer relevant to the peer 
disagreement debate which it was supposed to be central to. As UTIntra is 
compatible with multiple doxastic attitudes being justified in cases of peer 
disagreement, the initial motivation behind UT is now completely lost. Thus, UT-
proponents should not accept Objection 5 as it indirectly undermines UT.  
5. Concluding Remarks  
This paper has introduced a new counterexample to UT which involves logical 
disagreement. To legitimize this example and strengthen the case for it, I have 
shown that five different objections trying to save UT from Logical Disagreement 
fails. Two of the five objections were simply fended off, one needed further 
development to pose any real threat, while explaining away the counterexample 
with either one of the remaining two options resulted in an unbearable indirect 
defeat of the thesis. Hence, in the absence of successful objections to Logical 
Disagreement, I recommend that we hesitate in accepting UT as a general epistemic 
principle.22 
                                                        
22 Thanks to Francesco Berto, Jessica Brown and Klemens Kappel for helpful comments on earlier 
versions of the paper. 
